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Canadian Military Journal

The Joint Support Ship Revisited

Martin Shadwick
Martin Shadwick
Abstract :

Over the past twenty-or-so years, the navy’s Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ship replacement project has become, in some respects, the ‘Rodney Dangerfield’ of Canadian defence procurement. Renamed, repackaged, and re-imagined on occasions almost too numerous to count, and seemingly unable to generate the type of sustained, high-level political and other support necessary to actually put ships in the water on a timely basis, the AOR replacement effort has suffered the further indignity of near-invisibility on the country’s political, media, and public radar screens. Admittedly, the limelight is not always a comfortable or desirable location—recall, for example, the disquieting political and media histrionics surrounding Sea King replacement and the abortive acquisition of the EH101 maritime helicopter in the early 1990s—but securing fewer column inches and media air time than a host of smaller capital projects might well be interpreted as a ‘Dangerfieldesque’ lack of respect for an important maritime capability.

The replacement of Canada’s replenishment ships—originally a troika consisting of one Provider-class AOR (HMCS Provider, commissioned in 1963, decommissioned in 1998) and two newer and more capable Protecteur-class AORs (HMCS Protecteur, commissioned in 1969, and HMCS Preserver, commissioned in 1970)—has been a tortured process. In-house planning, late Cold War, envisaged their eventual replacement with three new AORs. The Senate Sub-Committee on National Defence, which published the results of a comprehensive review of Canada’s maritime defence in 1983, advocated many additions to the country’s maritime force structure, but was content with ‘one-for-one’ replacement of the existing AORs. Both of the two major policy statements on defence published in the early post-Cold War period (i.e., the Mulroney statement of 1992 and the Chrétien white paper of 1994) took note of the radically altered geo-strategic environment, the changing nature of peacekeeping and related operations, and the need for a more versatile, multi-purpose Canadian defence establishment, but neither had much to say about future AOR (or sealift and related) requirements. The 1992 document, for example, noted that HMCS Provider would be decommissioned, but did not include AORs or related vessels in its inventory of future capital requirements (it did include a new fleet of corvettes and a new diving support ship).The 1994 white paper declared: “… [that] to maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops, equipment and supplies for multilateral operations, the support ship HMCS Provider (initially slated to be paid off in 1996), will be retained in service, and plans for the eventual replacement of the existing fleet will be considered.”

Keywords :
The Joint Support Ship Revisited

Date Deposited : 08 Apr 2015 10:47

Last Modified : 08 Apr 2015 10:47

Official URL: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/arc/index-eng.asp

Volume 11, Number 1, - 2011

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