International Journal of Law and Management
.: Home > International Journal of Law and Management > 2004 > Volume 2004 Number 3 > Eyal Benvenisti
Public Choice and Global Administrative Law: Who’s Afraid of Executive Discretion?
University of Tel Aviv
Delegating authority to administrative agencies is necessary to make up for the generality of the law. The legislature cannot address every contingency. But delegation of authority entails discretion to the administrative agents, and discretion breeds corruption. Administrative law attempts to curb such discretion by structuring the decision-making process, providing for transparency and voice, and by setting up review mechanisms, including judicial review. Such attempts, however, produce new discretionary powers, and so on. The “cat and mouse” game continues indefinitely. As Martin Shapiro says, administrative law is “an endless game of catchup in which previously granted discretions are brought under rules, even as new discretions are granted, and no discretion granted is ever completely and finally reduced to rules.
The Theory on the Evolution of Administrative Law
Date Deposited : 18 Mar 2016 14:21
Official URL: http://www.iilj.org/publications/
Last Modified : 18 Mar 2016 14:21
Volume 2004, Number 3, - 2004 , ISSN 1552-6275
Full Text Original